Verification and Certification against Forum-Shopping Guidelines

In Altres v. Empleo (G.R. No. 180986, December 10, 2008), the SC revealed the court’s guidelines for the bench and bar which were culled “from jurisprudential pronouncements.”

"For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court restates in capsule form the jurisprudential pronouncements already reflected above respecting non-compliance with the requirements on, or submission of defective, verification and certification against forum shopping:

1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective certification against forum shopping.

2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.

3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.

4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of “substantial compliance” or presence of “special circumstances or compelling reasons.”

5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule.

6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. fellester.blogspot.com If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.

IN CASE OF CORPORATIONS… there should be a Board Resolution or a secretary’s certificate confirming authority to sign for the corporation.

Where the petitioner is a corporation, the certification against forum shopping should be signed by its duly authorized director or representative. This was enunciated in Eslaban, Jr. v. Vda. de Onorio, where the Court held that if the real party-in-interest is a corporate body, an officer of the corporation can sign the certification against forum shopping so long as he has been duly authorized by a resolution of its board of directors.

Likewise, where there are several petitioners, it is insufficient that only one of them executes the certification, absent a showing that he was so authorized by the others. That certification requires personal knowledge and it cannot be presumed that the signatory knew that his co-petitioners had the same or similar actions filed or pending.

Hence, a certification which had been signed without the proper authorization is defective and constitutes a valid cause for the dismissal of the petition.

Officers or employees who can sign Verification and Certification without a Board Resolution

In the recent case of Cagayan Valley Drug Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (G.R. No. 151413, February 13, 2008), the Court clarified the issue on whether the President of a corporation is authorized to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping, without need of a board resolution.

“In sum, we have held that the following officials or employees of the company can sign the verification and certification without need of a board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2) the President of a corporation, (3) the General Manager or Acting General Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case.”

It must be borne in mind that Sec. 23, in relation to Sec. 25, of the Corporation Code, clearly enunciates that all corporate powers are exercised, all business conducted, and all properties controlled by the board of directors. A corporation has a separate and distinct personality from its directors and officers and can only exercise its corporate powers through the board of directors. Thus, it is clear that an individual corporate fellester.blogspot.com officer cannot solely exercise any corporate power pertaining to the corporation without authority from the board of directors. This has been our constant holding in cases instituted by a corporation.

In a slew of cases, however, we have recognized the authority of some corporate officers to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping. In Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. CA (G.R. No. 139495, November 27, 2000, 346 SCRA 126, 132-133), we recognized the authority of a general manager or acting general manager to sign the verification and certificate against forum shopping; in Pfizer v. Galan (G.R. No. 143389, May 25, 2001, 358 SCRA 240, 246-248), we upheld the validity of a verification signed by an “employment specialist” who had not even presented any proof of her authority to represent the company; in Novelty Philippines, Inc. v. CA (G.R. No. 146125, September 17, 2003, 411 SCRA 211, 217-220), we ruled that a fellester.blogspot.com personnel officer who signed the petition but did not attach the authority from the company is authorized to sign the verification and non-forum shopping certificate; and in Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company v. WMC Resources International Pty. Ltd (Lepanto) (G.R. No. 153885, September 24, 2003, 412 SCRA 101, 109), we ruled that the Chairperson of the Board and President of the Company can sign the verification and certificate against non-forum shopping even without the submission of the board’s authorization.

While the above cases do not provide a complete listing of authorized signatories to the verification and certification required by the rules, the determination of the sufficiency of the authority was done on a case-to-case basis. The rationale applied in the foregoing cases is to justify the authority of corporate officers or representatives of the corporation to sign the verification or certificate against forum shopping, being “in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition.” (posted by Atty. Fel Lester G. Brillantes)

Petition for Review in the DOJ may suspend Arraignment but not issuance of a Warrant of Arrest

The basic issue propounded by petitioner is whether a pending resolution of a petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice concerning a finding of probable cause will suspend the proceedings in the trial court, including the implementation of a warrant of arrest.

Petitioner cites DOJ Department Circular No. 70, specifically paragraph 2 of Section 9 thereof, which provides that the appellant and the trial prosecutor shall see to it that, pending resolution of the appeal, the proceedings in court are held in abeyance. Somehow, petitioner is of the opinion that the suspension of proceedings in court, as provided in the said circular, includes the suspension of the implementation of warrants of arrest issued by the court.



SUPREME COURT:

Petitioner's contention is wrong.

It is well to remember that there is a distinction between the preliminary inquiry, which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest; and the preliminary investigation proper, which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be released. The determination of probable cause for purposes of issuing a warrant of arrest is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation proper – whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged – is the function of the investigating prosecutor.

As enunciated in Baltazar v. People, the task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed with the court is first and foremost to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused. Probable cause is such set of facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense charged in the Information or any offense included therein has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. fellester.blogspot.com In determining probable cause, the average man weighs the facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than suspicion; it requires less than evidence that would justify conviction.

The purpose of the mandate of the judge to first determine probable cause for the arrest of the accused is to insulate from the very start those falsely charged with crimes from the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.

The function of the judge to issue a warrant of arrest upon the determination of probable cause is exclusive; thus, the consequent implementation of a warrant of arrest cannot be deferred pending the resolution of a petition for review by the Secretary of Justice as to the finding of probable cause, a function that is executive in nature. To defer the implementation of the warrant of arrest would be an encroachment on the exclusive prerogative of the judge. It must be emphasized that petitioner filed with the trial court a motion to suspend proceedings and to suspend the implementation of the warrant of arrest in pursuance of a DOJ circular, and not a motion to quash the warrant of arrest questioning the issuance thereof.
Thus, there is no contest as to the validity or regularity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest.

Petitioner merely wanted the trial court to defer the implementation of the warrant of arrest pending the resolution by the Secretary of Justice of the petition for review that he filed citing the following directive contained in Section 9 of DOJ Department Circular:

x x x x
The appellant and the trial prosecutor shall see to it that, pending resolution of the appeal, the proceedings in court are held in abeyance.


The above provision of the Department Circular is directed specifically at the appellant and the trial prosecutor, giving them latitude in choosing a remedy to ensure that the proceedings in court are held in abeyance. However, nowhere in the said provision does it state that the court must hold the proceedings in abeyance. Therefore, the discretion of the court whether or not to suspend the proceedings or the implementation of the warrant of arrest, upon the motion of the appellant or the trial prosecutor, remains unhindered.

Petitioner has put emphasis on his argument that the suspension of the proceedings in court, including the suspension of the implementation of a warrant of arrest pending a resolution of an appeal by the Secretary of Justice, is in consonance with jurisprudence laid down by this Court in Marcelo v. Court of Appeals, Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, Dimatulac v. Villon, and Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. How.

A close reading of the factual antecedents in Ledesma, Solar Team Entertainment, Inc., Dimatulac and Marcelo clearly show that a common issue among them is whether the arraignment of an accused may be deferred pending resolution by the Secretary of Justice of a petition for review on the finding of probable cause, to which this Court ruled in the affirmative. Nowhere in the said decisions did it state that the implementation or enforcement of the warrant of arrest was also deferred or suspended, as herein petitioner prays for. (Viudez vs. CA, G.R. No. 152889, June 5, 2009)