Implied Warranties Prescriptive Period

On November 27, 1997, petitioner purchased from respondent a brand new white Toyota Hi-Lux. The vehicle was delivered to petitioner two days later. On October 18, 1998, petitioner demanded the replacement of the engine of the vehicle because it developed a crack after traversing Marcos Highway during a heavy rain. Petitioner asserted that respondent should replace the engine with a new one based on an implied warranty.

On the other hand, respondent maintains that petitioner’s cause of action was already barred by the statute of limitations under Article 1571 of the Civil Code for having been filed more than six months from the time the vehicle was purchased and/or delivered. Respondent reiterates that Article 169 of Republic Act No. 7394 does not apply.

SUPREME COURT:

Under Article 1599 of the Civil Code, once an express warranty is breached, the buyer can accept or keep the goods and maintain an action against the seller for damages. In the absence of an existing express warranty on the part of the respondent, as in this case, the allegations in petitioner’s complaint for damages were clearly anchored on the enforcement of an implied warranty against hidden defects, i.e., that the engine of the vehicle which respondent had sold to him was not defective.

By filing this case, petitioner wants to hold respondent responsible for breach of implied warranty for having sold a vehicle with defective engine. Such being the case, petitioner should have exercised this right within six months from the delivery of the thing sold. Since petitioner filed the complaint on April 20, 1999, or more than nineteen months counted from November 29, 1997 (the date of the delivery of the motor vehicle), his cause of action had become time-barred.

Petitioner contends that the subject motor vehicle comes within the context of Republic Act No. 7394. Thus, petitioner relies on Article 68 (f) (2) in relation to Article 169 of Republic Act No. 7394. Article 4 (q) of the said law fellester.blogspot.com defines “consumer products and services” as goods, services and credits, debts or obligations which are primarily for personal, family, household or agricultural purposes, which shall include, but not limited to, food, drugs, cosmetics, and devices. The following provisions of Republic Act No. 7394 state:

Art. 67. Applicable Law on Warranties. — The provisions of the Civil Code on conditions and warranties shall govern all contracts of sale with conditions and warranties.

Art. 68. Additional Provisions on Warranties. — In addition to the Civil Code provisions on sale with warranties, the following provisions shall govern the sale of consumer products with warranty:

e) Duration of warranty. The seller and the consumer may stipulate the period within which the express warranty shall be enforceable. If the implied warranty on merchantability accompanies an express warranty, both will be of equal duration.

Any other implied warranty shall endure not less than sixty (60) days nor more than one (1) year following the sale of new consumer products.

Consequently, even if the complaint is made to fall under the Republic Act No. 7394, the same should still be dismissed since the prescriptive period for implied warranty thereunder, which is one year, had likewise lapsed.(De Guzman vs. Toyota, G.R. No. 141480, November 29, 2006)

Please read full text of the SC Decision. Click here.

COMMENTS TO SC RULING

The conclusion of the Supreme Court in the above-mentioned Decision stresses that the warranty provisions in Article 68 is not merely a duration of warranties but also to be interpreted as a period within which a buyer must file an action arising from warranty against hidden defects.

This also leads one to ask: what types of action then should accrue within two (2) years as contemplated by the phrase “in case of hidden defects, from discovery thereof” in Article 169 of RA No. 7394?

SC on Controversial CJ Midnight Appointment

SC Chief Justice Reynato Puno’s compulsory retirement will be on May 17, 2010 or seven (7) days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.

Legal dilemmas:

1. May President GMA appoint CJ Puno’s successor, considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term (MIDNIGHT APPOINTMENTS), except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety?

2. What is the relevance of Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department) of the Constitution, which provides that any vacancy in the SC shall be filled within 90 days from the occurrence thereof, from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the JBC for every vacancy, to the matter of the appointment of his successor?


SUGGESTED ANSWER:


Yes. The SC ruled that the President may appoint CJ Puno’s successor because “Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary. “Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so.” Thus, the SC resolves to reverse its ruling in Valenzuela (298 SCRA 408).

The Court said that “Although Valenzuela came to hold that the prohibition covered even judicial appointments, it cannot be disputed that the Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Thereby, the confirmation made to the JBC by then Senior Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado of this Court, a former member of the Constitutional Commission, about the prohibition not being intended to apply to the appointments to the Judiciary, which confirmation Valenzuela even expressly mentioned, should prevail.

The SC also ruled that Section 15, Article VII does not apply as well to all other appointments in the Judiciary. “Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, we have no doubt that the Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Department.”

“The lack of any appointed occupant of the office of Chief Justice harms the independence of the Judiciary, because the Chief Justice is the head of the entire Judiciary. The Chief Justice performs functions absolutely significant to the life of the nation. With the entire Supreme Court being the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, fellester.blogspot.com the Chief Justice is the Chairman of the Tribunal. There being no obstacle to the appointment of the next Chief Justice, aside from its being mandatory for the incumbent President to make within the 90-day period from May 17, 2010, there is no justification to insist that the successor of Chief Justice Puno be appointed by the next President,” the Court ruled. (De Castro vs. JBC, G. R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010)



May the President appoint the next Chief Justice from among the sitting justices of the Court even without a JBC list?


SUPREME COURT:

“As a matter of fact, in an extreme case, we can even raise a doubt on whether a JBC list is necessary at all for the President – any President – to appoint a Chief Justice if the appointee is to come from the ranks of the sitting justices of the Supreme Court.

Sec. 9, Article VIII says:

xxx. The Members of the Supreme Court xxx shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for any vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
xxx


The provision clearly refers to an appointee coming into the Supreme Court from the outside, that is, a non-member of the Court aspiring to become one. It speaks of candidates for the Supreme Court, not of those who are already members or sitting justices of the Court, all of whom have previously been vetted by the JBC.

Can the President, therefore, appoint any of the incumbent Justices of the Court as Chief Justice?

The question is not squarely before us at the moment, but it should lend itself to a deeper analysis if and when circumstances permit. It should be a good issue for the proposed Constitutional Convention to consider in the light of Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile’s statement that the President can appoint the Chief Justice from among the sitting justices of the Court even without a JBC list.(De Castro vs. JBC, G. R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010)