Change of Last Name in Passports

Petitioner Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen whose Philippine passport was then expiring on 27 October 2000. Petitioner being married to Francisco R. Rallonza, the following entries appear in her passport: “Rallonza” as her surname, “Maria Virginia” as her given name, and “Remo” as her middle name. Prior to the expiry of the validity of her passport, petitioner, whose marriage still subsists, applied for the renewal of her passport with the DFA office in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A., with a request to revert to her maiden name and surname in the replacement passport. The DFA denied her request ruling that Section 5(d) of Republic Act No. 8239 (RA 8239) or the Philippine Passport Act of 1996 “offers no leeway for any other interpretation than that only in case of divorce, annulment, or declaration [of nullity] of marriage may a married woman revert to her maiden name for passport purposes.” Is the DFA correct?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes. The SC ruled that for passport issuance purposes, a married woman, such as petitioner, whose marriage subsists, may not change her family name at will.

Title XIII of the Civil Code governs the use of surnames. In the case of a married woman, Article 370 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 370. A married woman may use:

(1)HER MAIDEN FIRST NAME AND SURNAME AND ADD HER HUSBAND’S SURNAME, OR

(2)HER MAIDEN FIRST NAME AND HER HUSBAND'S SURNAME, OR

(3)HER HUSBAND’S FULL NAME, BUT PREFIXING A WORD INDICATING THAT SHE IS HIS WIFE, SUCH AS “MRS.”


Clearly, a married woman has an option, but not a duty, to use the surname of the husband in any of the ways provided by Article 370 of the Civil Code. She is therefore allowed to use not only any of the three names provided in Article 370, but also her maiden name upon marriage. She is not prohibited from continuously using her maiden name once she is married because when a woman marries, she does not change her name but only her civil status. Further, this interpretation is in consonance with the principle that surnames indicate descent.

In the present case, petitioner, whose marriage is still subsisting and who opted to use her husband’s surname in her old passport, requested to resume her maiden name in the replacement passport arguing that no law prohibits her from using her maiden name. Petitioner cites Yasin v. Honorable Judge Shari’a District Court as the applicable precedent.

However, Yasin is not squarely in point with this case. Unlike in Yasin, which involved a Muslim divorcee whose former husband is already married to another woman, petitioner’s marriage remains subsisting. Another point, Yasin did not involve a request to resume one’s maiden name in a replacement passport, fellester.blogspot.com but a petition to resume one’s maiden name in view of the dissolution of one’s marriage.


The law governing passport issuance is RA 8239 and the applicable provision in this case is Section 5(d).


The Court notes that petitioner would not have encountered any problems in the replacement passport had she opted to continuously and consistently use her maiden name from the moment she was married and from the time she first applied for a Philippine passport. However, petitioner consciously chose to use her husband’s surname before, in her previous passport application, and now desires to resume her maiden name. If we allow petitioner’s present request, definitely nothing prevents her in the future from requesting to revert to the use of her husband’s surname. Such unjustified changes in one's name and identity in a passport, which is considered superior to all other official documents, cannot be countenanced. Otherwise, undue confusion and inconsistency in the records of passport holders will arise. Thus, for passport issuance purposes, a married woman, such as petitioner, whose marriage subsists, may not change her family name at will. (Remo vs. DFA, G.R. No. 169202, March 5, 2010)

Implied Warranties Prescriptive Period

On November 27, 1997, petitioner purchased from respondent a brand new white Toyota Hi-Lux. The vehicle was delivered to petitioner two days later. On October 18, 1998, petitioner demanded the replacement of the engine of the vehicle because it developed a crack after traversing Marcos Highway during a heavy rain. Petitioner asserted that respondent should replace the engine with a new one based on an implied warranty.

On the other hand, respondent maintains that petitioner’s cause of action was already barred by the statute of limitations under Article 1571 of the Civil Code for having been filed more than six months from the time the vehicle was purchased and/or delivered. Respondent reiterates that Article 169 of Republic Act No. 7394 does not apply.

SUPREME COURT:

Under Article 1599 of the Civil Code, once an express warranty is breached, the buyer can accept or keep the goods and maintain an action against the seller for damages. In the absence of an existing express warranty on the part of the respondent, as in this case, the allegations in petitioner’s complaint for damages were clearly anchored on the enforcement of an implied warranty against hidden defects, i.e., that the engine of the vehicle which respondent had sold to him was not defective.

By filing this case, petitioner wants to hold respondent responsible for breach of implied warranty for having sold a vehicle with defective engine. Such being the case, petitioner should have exercised this right within six months from the delivery of the thing sold. Since petitioner filed the complaint on April 20, 1999, or more than nineteen months counted from November 29, 1997 (the date of the delivery of the motor vehicle), his cause of action had become time-barred.

Petitioner contends that the subject motor vehicle comes within the context of Republic Act No. 7394. Thus, petitioner relies on Article 68 (f) (2) in relation to Article 169 of Republic Act No. 7394. Article 4 (q) of the said law fellester.blogspot.com defines “consumer products and services” as goods, services and credits, debts or obligations which are primarily for personal, family, household or agricultural purposes, which shall include, but not limited to, food, drugs, cosmetics, and devices. The following provisions of Republic Act No. 7394 state:

Art. 67. Applicable Law on Warranties. — The provisions of the Civil Code on conditions and warranties shall govern all contracts of sale with conditions and warranties.

Art. 68. Additional Provisions on Warranties. — In addition to the Civil Code provisions on sale with warranties, the following provisions shall govern the sale of consumer products with warranty:

e) Duration of warranty. The seller and the consumer may stipulate the period within which the express warranty shall be enforceable. If the implied warranty on merchantability accompanies an express warranty, both will be of equal duration.

Any other implied warranty shall endure not less than sixty (60) days nor more than one (1) year following the sale of new consumer products.

Consequently, even if the complaint is made to fall under the Republic Act No. 7394, the same should still be dismissed since the prescriptive period for implied warranty thereunder, which is one year, had likewise lapsed.(De Guzman vs. Toyota, G.R. No. 141480, November 29, 2006)

Please read full text of the SC Decision. Click here.

COMMENTS TO SC RULING

The conclusion of the Supreme Court in the above-mentioned Decision stresses that the warranty provisions in Article 68 is not merely a duration of warranties but also to be interpreted as a period within which a buyer must file an action arising from warranty against hidden defects.

This also leads one to ask: what types of action then should accrue within two (2) years as contemplated by the phrase “in case of hidden defects, from discovery thereof” in Article 169 of RA No. 7394?