'short-time' ban 'unconstitutional'

Mayor Lim signed into law City Ordinance No. 7774 prohibiting short-time admission, short-time admission rates, and wash-up rate schemes in hotels, motels, inns, lodging houses, pension houses, and similar establishments in the city of manila. White Light Corporation and other operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila complained that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy and the freedom of movement; an invalid exercise of police power; and an unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business. On the other hand, the City of Manila argued that the Ordinance is a valid police power measure. It asserts that the subject establishments “have gained notoriety as venue of ‘prostitution, adultery and fornications’ in Manila. Thus, it became the ‘ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers.” Is Ordinance No. 7774 constitutional?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, Ordinance No. 7774 is unconstitutional. The SC ruled that the ordinance is an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. “The Ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The Ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.”

That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work.

More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.

Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power is subject to judicial review when life, liberty or property is affected.

The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants.

Further, it is apparent that the Ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. (visit fellester.blogspot.com) Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect “wash rates” from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments. (White Light Corp. vs. City of ManilaG.R. No. 122846, January 20, 2009)


Notes:

In Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila (1967) upheld the validity a City Ordinance requiring patrons to fill up a prescribed form stating personal information such as name, gender, nationality, age, address and occupation before they could be admitted to a motel, hotel or lodging house.

In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., the Court affirmed the nullification of a city ordinance that sought a blanket ban on motels, inns and similar establishments in the Ermita-Malate area.

xxx The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements:

(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy
(6) must not be unreasonable.

Who can file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage?

A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed SOLELY by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (March 15, 2003); and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.

Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage.

The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole architects of a healthy, loving, peaceful marriage. They are the only ones who can decide when and how to build the foundations of marriage. The spouses alone are the engineers of their marital life. They are simultaneously the directors and actors of their matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence, they alone can and should decide when to take a cut, but only in accordance with the grounds allowed by law.

The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988. [18]

The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of their successional rights.

While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.

It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003 is prospective in its application.

CARLOS v. SANDOVAL


Teofilo and Felicidad got married in 1962. Thirty years after marriage, Teofilo died intestate leaving his wife and son Teofilo Carlos ll. In 1995, Teofilo’s brother Juan filed a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of Teofilo and Felicidad's marriage in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II. Can Juan file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage?

SUGGESTED ANSWER

In Carlos vs. Sandoval, although the marriage was celebrated before Aug. 3, 1988and the petition was filed before March, 15, 2003, Juan should first show that he is a real party-in interest before he may be allowed to file the said petition.

"The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be construed as a license for any person to institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person must appear to be the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Elsewise stated, Juan must be the real party-in-interest. For it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest."

Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action.


Is Juan a Real Party-in-Interest?

The SC ruled that "the case must be remanded to determine whether or not Juan is a real-party-in-interest to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage in controversy.


It bears stressing that the legal personality of petitioner Juan to bring the nullity of marriage case is contingent upon the final declaration that Teofilo II is not a legitimate, adopted, or illegitimate son of Teofilo.

In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died intestate in 1992, his only surviving compulsory heirs are respondent Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II. Under the law on succession, successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and the compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law.

Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory heirs in Article 887, CC. But although a collateral relative, such as a brother, does not fall within the ambit of a compulsory heir, he still has a right to succeed to the estate. Articles 1001 and 1003 of the New Civil Code provide:

xxx

xxx Thus, if Teofilo II is finally found and proven to be not a legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner Juan succeeds to the other half of the estate of his brother, the first half being allotted to the widow pursuant to Article 1001 of the New Civil Code. This makes Juan a real-party-interest to seek the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. If the subject marriage is found to be void ab initio, petitioner succeeds to the entire estate.

However, If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo, then Juan has no legal personality to ask for the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother and respondent Felicidad. This is based on the ground that he has no successional right to be protected, hence, does not have proper interest. For although the marriage in controversy may be found to be void from the beginning, still, petitioner would not inherit. This is because the presence of descendant, illegitimate, [34] or even an adopted child [35] excludes the collateral relatives from inheriting from the decedent.

Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the merits to determine the validity or nullity of the subject marriage is called for. But the RTC is strictly instructed to dismiss the nullity of marriage case for lack of cause of action if it is proven by evidence that Teofilo II is a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo Carlos, the deceased brother of petitioner.(Carlos vs. Sandoval, G.R. No. 179922, December 16, 2008)

Senate: not a continuing body

In the leading case of “Nazareno vs Arnault,” July 18, 1950, the SC ruled that, unlike the House of Representatives, the Senate was a continuing body. Under the 1987 Constitution, is the Senate still a continuing body? Is there a need for the Senate to republish its rules of procedure in conducting inquiries in aid of legislation?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. The Senate cannot be deemed to be a continuing body. The Senate must republish its rules of procedure.

Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his Dissenting and Concurring Opinion, in Neri vs. Senate opined that “the present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no longer a continuing legislative body. The present Senate has twenty-four members, twelve of whom are elected every three years for a term of six years each. Thus, the term of twelve Senators expires every three years, leaving less than a majority of Senators to continue into the next Congress. The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 Constitution, requires a majority of Senators to “constitute a quorum to do business.”

“Justice Carpio, observes that “Nazareno” was decided under the 1935 Constitution when only eight of the 24 senators were elected every two years such that 16 senators constituting two-thirds of the Senate “always continued into the next Congress.” Since only a majority or 13 of the 24 members were needed to constitute a quorum and do business, the Senate was deemed a continuing body.”

In contrast, under the 1987 Constitution, the term of 12 of the 24 senators expired every three years “leaving less than a majority to continue into the next Congress.” Thus, the present Senate cannot be deemed a continuing body. Ergo, the rules must be republished after the expiration of the term of 12 senators. (visit fellester.blogspot.com)

“The foregoing distinction may appear hair-splitting but it is essential to due process and the rule of law. The Senate Rules of Procedure put at risk the liberty of witnesses and resource persons during investigations. Hence, the Constitution and the rules must be strictly construed in favor of the people and against the Senate.” (Are the Senate Investigation Rules Valid? by CJ Panganiban, Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 06, 2008)


The present Senate of the 14th Congress conducted an inquiry in aid of legislation on the “Hello Garci” tapes which allegedly contained President GMA’s instructions to former Comelec Commissioner Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. The Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and 2006. With respect to the present Senate, however, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their session. Is the Senate investigation valid?


SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. The SC declared invalid for lack of compliance with the publication requirement the previous Senate inquiry in aid of legislation on the “Hello Garci” tapes. “However, the Senate may now call for a new inquiry on the same following the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure in two major dailies last October 2008.”

The Court cited sec. 21, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution which mandates the publication of the rules of procedure of either the Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees before it may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.

The SC reiterated its ruling in Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations that the phrase “duly published rules of procedure” requires the Senate of every Congress to publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of the Senate’s membership, the composition of the Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit. Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the 14th Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm.

The Court said that the respondents cannot justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication requirement by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and that they are published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web page. “The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senate’s defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution…The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate,” it said. It added that the respondents’ invocation of the provisions of RA 8792, Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet was incorrect, stressing that “the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents” but such “does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.” (GR No. 170338, Garcillano v. House of Representatives; GR No. 179275, Rañada v. Senate, December 23, 2008)